A Ulysses Pact with Artificial Systems. How to Deliberately Change the Objective Spirit with Cultured AI by Gransche, Bruno
Computer Ethics - Philosophical Enquiry (CEPE) Proceedings 
Volume 2019 CEPE 2019: Risk & Cybersecurity Article 16 
5-29-2019 
A Ulysses Pact with Artificial Systems. How to Deliberately 
Change the Objective Spirit with Cultured AI 
Bruno Gransche 
University of Siegen, Germany 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/cepe_proceedings 
 Part of the Applied Behavior Analysis Commons, Applied Ethics Commons, Communication 
Technology and New Media Commons, Computational Engineering Commons, Continental Philosophy 
Commons, Critical and Cultural Studies Commons, Digital Humanities Commons, Disability Studies 
Commons, Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons, Information Literacy Commons, Other Philosophy 
Commons, Risk Analysis Commons, Robotics Commons, Science and Technology Studies Commons, 
Social and Philosophical Foundations of Education Commons, Social Influence and Political 
Communication Commons, Social Media Commons, Social Psychology Commons, Social Psychology and 
Interaction Commons, Sociology of Culture Commons, and the Technology and Innovation Commons 
Custom Citation 
Gransche, B. (2019). A Ulysses pact with artificial systems. How to deliberately change the objective spirit 
with cultured AI. In D. Wittkower (Ed.), 2019 Computer Ethics - Philosophical Enquiry (CEPE) Proceedings, 
(22 pp.). doi: 10.25884/b8s7-sq95 Retrieved from https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/cepe_proceedings/
vol2019/iss1/16 
This Paper is brought to you for free and open access by ODU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion 
in Computer Ethics - Philosophical Enquiry (CEPE) Proceedings by an authorized editor of ODU Digital Commons. 
For more information, please contact digitalcommons@odu.edu. 
 
 
 
A Ulysses Pact with Artificial Systems: How to Deliberately Change 
the Objective Spirit with Cultured AI 
 
Bruno Gransche 
University of Siegen 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The article introduces a concept of cultured technology, i.e. intelligent systems capable 
of interacting with humans and showing (or simulating) manners, of following customs 
and of socio-sensitive considerations. Such technologies might, when deployed on a 
large scale, influence and change the realm of human customs, traditions, standards of 
acceptable behavior, etc. This realm is known as the "objective spirit" (Hegel), which 
usually is thought of as being historically changing but not subject to deliberate human 
design. The article investigates the question of whether the purposeful design of interac-
tive technologies (as cultured technologies) could enable us to shape modes of human 
social behavior and thus to influence those customary standards that determine what is 
considered (in-)appropriate. Which moral rules could (possibly) guide such interventions 
into the normative fabric of our human social relations? Would it, for example, be appro-
priate to design technology to exhibit (or simulate) cultured, polite, or moral behavior in 
order to educate (or nudge) individuals to socially desired behavior? This could be 
called “deception as a way to virtue” – a thought which can already be found in Kant. 
Another way of utilizing technology to deliberately influence the social and individual di-
mension of human behavior would be what the article – inspired by an episode in 
Homer’s Ulysses – introduces as “Ulysses pacts”: Ulysses, the cunning hero, enters into 
a pact with his crew to tie him to the mast and disobey all orders while near the Sirens – 
a strategy of assisted self-constraint. Ulysses-pact technologies might be a means to 
force us to stick to our commitments by resisting giving in to our weakness of will at a 
future point in time so that we cannot revise earlier decisions and commitments. Do 
Ulysses-pact technologies support us, for example, in the autonomous achievement of 
desired behavior, thus helping us on a path to virtue, or are they but a ruse, devised to 
drill predictable consumers? 
 
Keywords: philosophy of technology, ethics, objective spirit, culture, manners, social ap-
propriateness, assistive systems, cultured technology, interactive systems, Ulysses, He-
gel, Kant. 
 
 
This article reflects on the consequences of living with technology, with and among arti-
ficial agents. Interactive robots and virtual agents are entering our everyday life and 
playing a new role in our social relations. The company we keep and the way we keep it 
influence what kind of company we are and how we relate to others. The appropriate-
ness of our social behavior – the ways in which we act and relate – depends on our so-
 
 
 
cial relations – to whom or what we relate and who we are. While it might seem appro-
priate for our cats to jump on a guest’s lap right away, and this kind of behavior1 might 
seem odd yet cute and acceptable from our three-year-old child, on the part of our part-
ner it certainly is not and would cause quite some confusion. But what about our interac-
tive robot? Should it offer our guests a handshake or address them by their nicknames 
– having learned such manners by observation? Or, to put it more generally: Should ar-
tificial agents exhibit socio-sensitive behavior; should we build cultured technology and 
teach robots etiquette?  
Here, cultured technology is on the one hand understood as systems that are  ar-
tificially synthesized, man-made, and engineered, and yet partly grown (like cultured 
pearls): the emphasis is on self-dynamic aspects in their origin, as in the case of ma-
chine learning that is ‘controlled’ by defining thresholds and selecting training data (simi-
lar to adjusting the growing conditions of pearls) but not by detailed design of the final 
structure (Karafyllis, 2003). On the other hand – and particularly so in the context of this 
article – cultured is meant in the sense of showing (simulating) manners and socio-sen-
sitive considerations such as tact, adaptive refinement in speech and behavior, etc. If 
the most profound technologies phenomenologically escape our attention; if they 
“weave themselves into the fabric of everyday life until they become indistinguishable 
from it” (Weiser, 1991, p. 94), then interactive technologies might also need to blend in 
in terms of manners. Otherwise, they will stand out and disturb social interaction as the 
artificial addendum they hitherto have been. The Google Duplex chatbot that success-
fully booked an appointment at a hairdresser’s (Welch, 2018) simulated natural lan-
guage with typical human ‘flaws’ such as “mhm…” as well as respecting typical rules of 
etiquette like greeting and thanking, allowing the other time to think and respond, giving 
options, etc. Its non-human nature thus went unnoticed. We, humans, are most accus-
tomed to interhuman interaction and humanlike interaction behavior is therefore the 
most predictable and least confusing. Socially interactive artificial agents could be very 
successful if they managed to be almost indistinguishable from human participants,2 alt-
hough they risk falling into the uncanny valley (Mori, 2012) if they come close, but not 
close enough. This article focuses on possible long-term effects of high exposure to arti-
ficial agents simulating interhuman behavior. The standards by which the appropriate-
ness of behavior is judged are themselves a result of social behavior. They belong – as 
part of the customs; the ethos – to the realm of the objective spirit (Hegel), which results 
from human action but is not open to individual alteration efforts. Designing socio-sensi-
tive interactive technologies, therefore, not only results in easier and more comfortable 
human-machine interaction, but also offers a way – by exposure – to purposefully shape 
the objective spirit; the culture; the ensemble of shared customary practices. If the realm 
of the objective spirit is thus at the disposal of purposeful designing individuals, this 
 
1 In this article, I will not specifically distinguish between action (understood in terms of means and end), behavior 
(understood in terms of experience and expression; Dilthey (1965, pp. 191–226)), and process (understood in terms of 
cause and effect). Behaving – that is, doing something in an unaware habituated nonintentional way – has to be differ-
entiated from acting – that is, doing something (choosing and using means) to intentionally actualize an end. When do 
humans behave and when do they act? Do artificial agents always perform cause/effect-related processes (answer: 
yes) or do they ever behave or act in the human sense (answer: no)? Those distinctions and questions will be put aside 
here for complexity reasons, for they are not the focus of this article. 
2 Recent research suggests that concealment of the non-human nature could make human-machine interaction more 
cooperative and efficient: Ishowo-Oloko et al. (2019) 
 
 
 
raises the question of how it should be designed and how the transformation could be 
justified.  
Alongside several ethical pitfalls (see below), we can also identify a hope: If our 
day-to-day interactive behavior deposits and sediments itself in the objective spirit in 
layers of routines, habits, customs, habitus, etc., if designing interactive technologies 
means significantly shaping our day-to-day behavior, and if the specifics of the objective 
spirit are the transcendental conditions of further behavior, then we actually could shape 
our social capabilities and moral dispositions by shaping technology. Alas, this broad-
scale societal intervention could be dominated by just a very few individuals – for in-
stance, the decision-makers at current tech giants or “Siren Servers” (Lanier). Ethical, 
cultural, political, aesthetical, etc. implications have therefore to be considered early on. 
One question that will be addressed here is whether cultured behavior can be deliber-
ately induced by shaping cultured technology. If so, two areas of potential – or indeed 
problems – arise. Firstly, one empowering aspect is that design, engineering, and use 
practices could gain the potential to deliberately shape social behavior and moral judg-
ments, actions, and eventually dispositions. Secondly, that power needs to be demo-
cratically controlled, yet tends to accumulate in the hands of just a few. 
 
 
Cultured behavior via cultured technology 
 
With Hans-Georg Gadamer, a notion of appropriateness can be grasped as tact (Gada-
mer, 2011, pp. 13–15); as a kind of social sensitivity. David Kaplan linked the topics of 
tact/politeness, education, self-cultivation and appropriate technology in the following 
passage: 
 
What is this sense of appropriateness? For Gadamer it is ‘tact.’ It is a particular 
kind of social sensitivity to social situations and the judgment of how to behave in 
them. Tact is the tacit knowledge of appropriate action for a particular circum-
stance. It involves knowing what to say and do—and what not to say and do. Alt-
hough not based on general principles or universal concepts, Gadamer maintains 
tact is a universal sense that requires of all that we remain both sensitive to par-
ticular situations, guided by the wisdom of the past, yet open to other points of 
view. Although it is difficult to prove any matter of tact conclusively, it is not an ir-
rational concept; it is merely an acquired ability. How does one acquire it? 
Through education in culture, development, and self-cultivation in society. That is 
to say, Bildung. The only way to acquire interpretive tact is through practice. This 
connection between tact and practical wisdom has completely dropped out of the 
contemporary conversation of technology. But what is largely at issue in ques-
tions concerning the good life in a technological age is this notion of appropriate-
ness in conduct. Technology is shot through with tact. It answers key questions, 
such as how things ought to be designed, how they should be used, how they 
should affect others, how they should be governed. Tact may not provide a pre-
cise answer to any of these questions, but if universalist and scientific concepts 
are ruled out (or not exclusively employed) then all that is left is practical wisdom, 
developed over time, through Bildung. After Gadamer, the notion of ‘appropriate 
 
 
 
technology’ takes on a whole new dimension. New answers might be found to 
vexing practical questions concerning technology. (Kaplan, 2011, p. 232) 
 
In order to follow this idea, it is necessary to consider some basic aspects of social ap-
propriateness in interhuman as well as in hybrid (human-machine) behavior. How is be-
havior judged as socially appropriate – or not – amongst humans? First of all, it has to 
be perceived via a set of observables such as voice and tone, gestures and facial ex-
pressions, posture and positioning, etc. that vary in time,3 space,4 and mode.5 Which 
manifestation of those observables are judged as appropriate6 then heavily depends on 
five interrelated dimensions:7 1. the situational context (work-meeting, night at the 
opera, with the family on the beach), 2. the pursued action or task (planting a tree, giv-
ing a talk, killing ‘Il Commendatore’ on stage), 3. individual specifics (quod licet Jovi non 
licet bovi, the Queen vs. Keanu Reeves vs. Kaspar Hauser, intelligence, attractiveness, 
reputation, etc.), 4. the social relation between the interacting participants (family, au-
thority, status, power difference etc.). All of which finally relate back to 5. higher-level 
(shared, customary) standards like dignity and human rights, which explicitly prohibit 
distinctions by sex, race, origin, property, or status and trump situational relativity. And 
yet, given the same human rights, the same observable manifestations (a smile, proxim-
ity, even spitting in someone’s face, etc.) are judged differently as appropriate for (un-) 
attractive men/women working as bartenders/priests/bodyguards in China/Mexico/Den-
mark in 1860/today/2100 and so on.  
If insights could be gained about relations between such judgments and signifi-
cant groups of observables that are typically connected to specific contexts, tasks, and 
social relations, then could those insights inform the socio-sensitive design of interactive 
technology? Or, could learning socio-sensitive technology even scan and compile those 
relations, and could this in turn enable us to learn about the dimensions of our appropri-
ate behavior through an analysis of those machine compilations? Can those observa-
bles be made machine-readable – or which of them could be – and if so, could the inter-
pretative steps that relate observable manifestations to appropriateness judgments be 
 
3 This dimension refers to giving or taking time in conversations, specific rhythms in interaction, respecting or ignoring 
entry, interrupting, or exit points of interaction scripts, etc. 
4 This dimension is, for example, adressed in proxemics, where distances between interacting agents are studied, or 
in the study of F-formations, where their specific positioning towards each other is studied. For recent work on F-
formations, see: “A key skill for social robots in the wild will be to understand the structure and dynamics of conversa-
tional groups in order to fluidly participate in them.” Hedayati, Szafir, and Andrist (2019 - 2019, abstract). See also for 
a recent automation attempt: Raman and Hung (2019). 
5 Mode could refer to ironic use of observables that indicate the opposite or different meanings than the ones shown, 
e.g. a pat on the back that might indicate familiarity could strategically be used to create and emphasize hierarchy, just 
as a compliment elevates the complimenting person into a position of being able to judge and grant praise.  
6 The judgment on appropriateness is of course always a judgment on inappropriateness. Watts, for instance, proposed 
a conceptual framework that distinguishes non-politic/inappropriate (negatively marked) behavior from behavior poli-
tics/appropriate behavior that is subdivided into unmarked behavior and positively marked behavior. This constitutes a 
continuum that ranges from rude, impolite, non-polite, polite to over-polite behavior (Locher and Watts (2005, xliii)). For 
reasons of brevity, this will only be mentioned as judgments on appropriateness, if not otherwise specified. 
7 The credit for this overarching five-dimensional framework on the factors of appropriateness must go to the team of 
the research project “poliTE - social appropriateness for artificial assistance” (https://polite.fokos.de/en/home_en/#). 
 
 
 
delegated in part to highly automated systems and integrated into socio-interactive tech-
nologies? And, if so, why should they be? There is a set of observables that are cur-
rently being researched and prototypically implemented in interactive systems, like ma-
chine judgments of the proper distance at which to keep participants (proxemics, e.g. 
Pepper). The entire strand of research on emotion-sensitive adaptive technology; hu-
manlike interaction; assistive, companion technology; social robots, etc. shares an im-
plicit premise: Humanlike or ‘natural’ – or in at least less artificial – interaction equals 
better interaction. Why would anyone build machines that simulate human behavior up 
to and beyond the uncanny valley? There are some obvious challenges, for instance 
potential deception that confuses users about the actual nature of the interacting entity 
– which would mean that those systems would pass the Turing test, at least temporarily. 
Such confusion could lead to a denial of fundamental respect for and the human rights 
(along with working rights and conditions) of fellow human beings in cases where AI 
systems instead of people are staged and assumed.8 Another risk could be to invite par-
asocial bonding – i.e. falling in love with fictional characters like James Bond or nonhu-
man entities like God or robots. Parasocial relations with technology could have prob-
lematic consequences such as saving one’s beloved robot (or car) instead of rescuing a 
fellow human in an emergency, or avenging property damage with bodily injury.  
Nonetheless, cultured technology could offer considerable potential for pleasant 
human-technology interactions, and this could have positive effects on a person’s 
mood, health, motivation, or performance. Respect researchers, for instance, consider a 
recipient-focused concept of respect in which a certain kind of respect is actualized if, 
and only if, a person feels himself or herself respected by someone regardless of 
whether his or her interlocutor does indeed respect him or her (van Quaquebeke & Eck-
loff, 2010). Even though technology could not respect a person in a fundamental sense 
– for instance, it would not be able to choose whom (not) to respect and would not have 
normative preferences that could shape such a choice – it could nonetheless simulate 
respect well enough for a person to feel respected by artificial agents. That would – ac-
cording to a recipient-based concept of respect – be sufficient to actualize significant 
positive effects on the motivation or performance and health of the person who feels re-
spected. Another potential advantage of socio-sensitive technology could be an overall 
reduction in inappropriate interruptions by interactive robots or AI systems that are in-
volved in hybrid social settings such as a conference coffee break that might be catered 
by robots. This article will focus on potential indirect or long-term effects of exposure to 
socio-sensitive cultured technology on the part of humans such as potential upskilling, 
training, education and so on. The basis of the supposed effects lies in the mechanism 
 
8 This is strategically the case with many data economy services that are staged as AI services whereas legions of 
human precarious workers substitute or enable the service. “Digital information is really just people in disguise” (Lanier 
(2013, p. 15). “However, Amazon is also exploring how to get non-elite service jobs out of the way of the Siren Servers 
of the future. The company offers a Web-based tool called Mechanical Turk. The name is a reference to a deceptive 
18th Century automaton that seemed to be a robotic Turk that could play chess, while in fact a real person was hidden 
inside. The Amazon version is a way to easily outsource – to real humans – those cloud-based tasks that algorithms 
still can't do, but in a framework that allows you to think of the people as software components. The interface doesn't 
hide the existence of the people, but it still does try to create a sense of magic, as if you can just pluck results out of 
the cloud at an incredibly low cost” (Lanier (2013, pp. 169–170). For recent work on the invisible human workforce that 
powers the Web, see: Gray and Suri (2019). 
 
 
 
of habituation that will be explicated with – an Aristotelian – Kant and that allows the un-
deniable deception in interaction with cultured technology to be reframed as potential, 
allowing us to think of deception as beneficial rather than harmful. 
 
 
Deception as a way to virtue 
 
There has been some critique and concern about human-machine interaction such as 
Amazon’s Alexa or Google’s assistant Google Home. The response of the tech giants 
was to implement very basic manners into the speech-based interaction: “Google Assis-
tant’s Pretty Please helps your kids mind their manners” (Gebhart, 2018) or “Alexa and 
the Age of Casual Rudeness” (Gordon, 2018). Interestingly, the supposed effect that 
people, especially children, who predominantly interact in the form of spoken com-
mands lose their manners and verbally degenerate to the grammatical imperative is not 
yet scientifically established. However, based on fundamental insights into the acquisi-
tion of skills – use it or lose it – such an effect seems not unlikely, which is why Google 
and Amazon reacted. Google’s Pretty Please simulates manners if addressed in a re-
spectful way. ‘Hello Google, turn on the lights please.’ will be answered, for instance, 
with ‘Thanks for asking so nicely.’  
Now politeness, as a special form of appropriate behavior and a symptom of be-
ing cultured, has a difficult relationship with sincerity and truthfulness; it implies some 
degree of mandatory deception and lying. Tact as a kind of “social sensitivity”, for in-
stance, can be shown by dissimulation, that is, pretending that something – such as im-
polite or embarrassing mishaps – did not happen even if it actually did. The fact that we 
often have to choose between an honest and a polite answer also shows that it is diffi-
cult to give an honest polite answer. Yet the politeness deception is not actually a case 
of genuinely deceiving someone and thus is not only not harmful, but indeed beneficial 
to the interlocutors and ultimately to the polite person him-/herself. In order to under-
stand the beneficial dimension of polite or cultured behavior and the potential impact of 
cultured technologies, it is worth looking at the following passage from Kant: 
 
§ 14. Collectively, the more civilized men are, the more they are actors. They as-
sume the appearance of attachment, of esteem for others, of modesty, and of 
disinterestedness, without ever deceiving anyone, because everyone under-
stands that nothing sincere is meant. (Kant, 1996, p. 37) 
 
Being an actor means playing a role, staging an ‘As if’ layer that by definition differs 
from the layer of the actual.9 Since ancient theater, there have been two possible as-
pects to such pretense: either showing something that is not – simulating – or not show-
ing something that is – dissimulating. Ancient Greek theater had two paradigmatic roles 
 
9 The philosopher Hans Vaihinger – who drew on Kant and inspired Sigmund Freud, amongst others – described the 
omnipresence and importance of our “useful fictions” in his Philosophy of ‘As if’: “‘As if’, i.e. appearance, the con-
sciously-false, plays an enormous part in science, in world-philosophies and in life.” Vaihinger (1935, xli). The notion of 
the consciously-false applies to the Kantian non-deceptive deception of politeness. Being polite is being false, but 
everybody knows it and thus no one is harmed by the falsehood.  
 
 
 
hereof, Alazon the simulant – the poser, imposter – and Eiron – hence irony – the dis-
simulant (Buttkewitz, 2002, p. 23; Gransche, 2017). The reason why this untruthfulness 
or deception – both concepts Kant otherwise argues against in the interest of self-re-
spect, which for him is to respect mankind represented in oneself10 – is not harmful but 
beneficial lies in the fundamental familiarity of all participants; it is because “everyone 
understands.” Kant sees an active habituation mechanism at work that links hexis11 – 
clearly an Aristotelianism – to virtue: 
 
Persons are familiar with this, and it is even a good thing that this is so in this 
world, for when men play these roles, virtues are gradually established, whose 
appearance had up until now only been affected. These virtues ultimately will be-
come part of the actor's disposition. To deceive the deceiver in ourselves, or the 
tendency to deceive, is a fresh return to obedience under the law of virtue. It is 
not a deception, but rather a blameless deluding of ourselves. (Kant, 1996, 
pp. 37–38) 
 
In highly simplified terms, this means that the saying ‘fake it until you make it’ also ap-
plies to the cultivation of virtues. Kant then relates this fundamental anthropological di-
agnosis to cultured, “good and honorable formal” behavior and to politeness, and em-
phasizes its enabling function for virtue: 
 
Nature has wisely implanted in man the propensity to easy self-deception in order 
to save, or at least lead man to, virtue. Good and honorable formal behavior is an 
external appearance which instills respect in others (an appearance which does 
not demean). Womankind is not at all satisfied when the male sex does not ap-
pear to admire her charms. Modesty (pudicitia), however, is self-constraint which 
conceals passion; nevertheless, as an illusion it is beneficial, for it creates the 
necessary distance between the sexes so that we do not degrade the one as a 
 
10 Kant is rather famous for rigorously condemning untruthfulness. He argues in The Metaphysics of Morals that lying 
does not need any harmful effect (against others) to be reprehensible because even if no one (else) is harmed (or even 
if someone is saved by a lie), lying always harms a) the lier, b) mankind represented in the lying person, and c) the law 
of truthfulness – which is the basis for all duties based on contracts. The idea of a harmless lie (as in politeness) seems 
inconsistent in this perspective. Two aspects stand against that impression of inconsistency: firstly, the ‘empty signs of 
well-wishing’ or the ‘non-deceiving deception’ Kant sees in politeness do not qualify as a lie in the strict sense of The 
Metaphysics of Morals. Especially the criterium of importance is hardly met because polite gestures are usually not a 
matter of life and death – contrary to the famous example of lying to a murderer about the whereabouts of a person 
hidden in one’s house (Kant (1797a, pp. 429–430)). Secondly, in the article Über ein vermeintes Recht aus 
Menschenliebe zu lügen (On a supposed right to lie from altruistic motives [my translation]) Kant repeatedly emphasizes 
that if a truthful answer would cause harm, avoiding the answer is best. Only where the answer cannot be avoided, 
truth should be spoken regardless of any harm. “Each human being has not only a right but even the strict duty to be 
truthful in statements he cannot avoid making, whether they harm himself or others.” [my translation]. Original: “Jeder 
Mensch aber hat nicht allein ein Recht, sondern sogar die strengste Pflicht zur Wahrhaftigkeit in Aussagen, die er nicht 
umgehen kann: sie mag nun ihm selbst oder andern schaden.“ (Kant (1797b, p. 428). Politeness can be seen as an 
art of avoiding potentially harmful statements. Being polite – with Kant – could mean the art of walking the line between 
not making harmful statements and not lying in the strict sense at the same time. 
11 “Aristotelian hexis denotes not just ethical behaviour, but also knowledge and technical skill, otherwise known as 
epistēmē and tekhnē. Aristotelianism, indeed, accommodates practical, theoretical, and poetic or technical ‘ways of 
being’ (hexeis): in each case these are stable qualitative aspects of the subject and of the objective situation. From a 
doctrinal point of view, hexis thus has a very wide scope that includes the domains of theôria, of poēsis and of praxis; 
thus it is important not to confine it to ethical behaviour.” Rodrigo (2011, p. 7) 
 
 
 
mere instrument of pleasure for the other. In general, everything that we call de-
cency (decorum) is of the same sort; it is just a beautiful illusion.  
 
Politeness (politesse) is an appearance of affability which instills affection. Bow-
ing and scraping (compliments) and all courtly gallantry, together with the warm-
est verbal assurances of friendship, are not always completely truthful. ‘My dear 
friends,’ says Aristotle, ‘there is no friend.’ But these demonstrations of politeness 
do not deceive because everyone knows how they should be taken, especially 
because signs of well-wishing and respect, though originally empty, gradually 
lead to genuine dispositions of this sort. (Kant, 1996, pp. 38–39) 
 
This is not the place to discuss issues of potential sexism in a piece of 18th-century an-
thropological work. In principle, Kant is not wrong about the need for or satisfactory ef-
fects of compliments, admiration, or other forms of positive social and relational work 
and acknowledgment. It is safe to say that it holds true not only for womankind but for 
humankind in general, regardless of whether the “bowing” is a literal bending of the 
spine or performed through social media likes and followers. The important point here is 
that Kant gives a reason for why the illusion that is created by self-constraint is benefi-
cial: “for it creates the necessary distance”. It is the same benefit Gadamer ascribes to 
tact: “Thus tact helps one to preserve distance. It avoids the offensive, the intrusive, the 
violation of the intimate sphere of the person.” (Gadamer, 2011, p. 15) Kant speaks 
about the distance between the sexes that is necessary to ensure the prohibition of in-
strumentalization as set out in his Categorical Imperative; to treat humanity never 
merely as a means to an end, but always at the same time as an end. To use a human 
being as a mere instrument, therefore, is to degrade that human in his or her human 
dignity. Cultured behavior, for instance, the beautiful illusion of gallantry, enables the 
necessary distance between “the sexes” that prevents degradation to a mere object of 
pleasure. This holds true for social interaction between humans in general, in other 
words men, women and any sexes in any direction. If we are about to introduce artificial 
interaction partners, one (non-capitalist) argument for making them socio-sensitive is 
that they could thus be made cultured or polite – that is, capable of self-constraint – in 
order to ensure the necessary distance between humans and artificial agents (and the 
disguised humans behind them) so that we do not degrade the one as a mere instru-
ment of profit for the other. We need, therefore, to constrain ourselves in social interac-
tions not to be overly direct or brutally honest and not to intrude on others. Modesty (pu-
dicitia) is one facilitator of distance and should be used not for the sake of artificial sys-
tems – they cannot be offended – but for ourselves to establish virtue gradually. The 
boomerang effect of being rude to someone with whom we interact justifies the effort of 
politeness. It is considered morally wrong to mock someone even if that someone is not 
able to detect the mockery; it could therefore be seen as equally reprehensible to mock 
young children and to mock artificial agents. Ultimately, we are not polite to others – 
 
 
 
only or mainly – out of consideration for them, but for ourselves.12 In this sense,13 it 
does not matter who or what the others are. This is one reason why we might consider 
manners in human-machine interaction and keep saying pretty please to our interactive 
systems and maybe ask for help rather than demand it from our artificial assistants. On 
the other hand, manners are not the only way to ensure a “necessary distance” between 
humans and artificial agents along with all other humans behind those systems (opera-
tors, data clients, etc.): carefully crafted levels of personalization and intimacy in those 
human-machine relations are another, if not the major other one. Any behavioral dis-
tancing effort will remain futile if the systems continuously gather data and those ulti-
mately in charge of the systems – ‘The Lords of the Siren Servers’, to coin a Homeric-
Tolkienian Lanierism – compile and sell the most personal and intimate information. As 
cultured behavior overcomes harassment or impertinence, we should design and ena-
ble cultured human-technology relations that help us overcome current technological 
impertinence.  
 
 
Deceiving machines 
 
By virtue of creating necessary distance, deception, which is a cunning self-deception, 
becomes beneficial. The mainstream and as such naïve moral demand ‘Be honest!’14 
has to be put into perspective, and deceit and illusion are normatively reversed from 
malicious to beneficial. But why does deception having beneficial effects defuse its po-
tentially harmful effects? Kant offers a reason for this as well: “these demonstrations of 
politeness do not deceive because everyone knows how they should be taken” – and – 
“everyone understands that nothing sincere is meant.” Just as ancient Greek theater au-
diences shared a (dis-)simulation literacy and thus knew how to take an Eiron (search 
for the hidden) or an Alazon (distrust the shown) on stage, most people share a basic 
culture-specific politeness literacy. Thus, in cultured social interaction, there is decep-
tion but “without ever deceiving anyone” (Kant). It follows that potentially harmful behav-
ior exists but without harmed victims because a shared understanding prevents the ac-
tualization of harm. In addition to that, through the mechanism of habituation, this kind 
of deception and self-deception leads to genuinely virtuous dispositions (hexis as the 
stable state of having those dispositions). The shared knowledge of how such deception 
is to be taken (hexis as cultural/ethical knowledge) and customary practices of how it is 
usually taken or meant are necessary preconditions for this deception to be harmless 
and beneficial. Within human-machine interaction, if we maintain good manners even 
towards artificial agents, we could benefit from the virtuous enabling effects while worry-
ing even less about potentially harmful effects, because machines cannot be deceived 
 
12 “It [Bildung as keeping oneself open to what is other, BG] embraces a sense of proportion and distance in relation to 
itself, and hence consists in rising above itself to universality. To distance oneself from oneself and from one's private 
purposes means to look at these in the way that others see them.” Gadamer (2011, p. 15) 
13 This holds only for the mentioned boomerang-character. Of course, the ban on instrumentalization as expressed in 
the Categorical Imperative refers to “humanity” and therefore cannot justify polite behavior towards nonhuman artificial 
agents.  
14 This is still a wide-spread go-to principal as seen for instance in one of the 12 rules for life by best-selling author and 
influential public mentor figure Jordan Peterson: “Tell the truth – or, at least, don't lie.” Peterson (2018).  
 
 
 
in a moral sense. ‘Deceiving’ machines (e.g. treating the robot politely) is not problem-
atic; being deceived by machines or by other humans via machines actually can be. Liv-
ing with socially intervening cultured – that is, deceptive! – technology is a problem be-
cause a shared knowledge of how to take that technology or those machines cannot 
easily be assumed and corresponding defusing practices have yet to be found, formed, 
and habituated. This means that as well as designing cultured technology we also need 
to develop cultural techniques for relating to new technologies – and for relating to new 
human-technology relations on a higher level15. Such a development takes time, proba-
bly longer than current technological innovation cycles.  
To sum up, social interaction that respects human dignity requires the necessary 
distance between the interacting parties. Cultured, “good and honorable”, polite behav-
ior is one way to create that distance. It is not the only one and not a sufficient one. The 
distancing effect is achieved by playing a role and via deception, yet this deception is 
harmless – because everyone understands it – and beneficial. The benefit lies in the 
aforementioned distance as well as in the potential to lead to genuine virtue. The mech-
anism that enables the latter benefit is habituation, or: fake it until you make it. This con-
nection has to be transferred to artificial interacting entities. Artificial agents are never in 
danger of being harmfully deceived. In contrast to human agents, therefore, they do not 
even need specific knowledge in order to defuse the deception. To artificial agents, we 
can put on a show that can help us gradually to establish virtuous dispositions, while 
worrying even less about potentially harmful deception. The challenge – apart from im-
plementing a complex phenomenon of social appropriateness and technology – lies in 
the potential harm that cultured technologies’ deception imposes on human participants. 
Firstly, people – being part of humanity – are at risk of becoming a mere instrument 
(most likely of profit) in the process; necessary distance has to be created and pre-
served in order to prevent technological impertinence and to protect human dignity. 
Secondly, people are absolutely deceivable in a moral sense; the harmful potential of 
machine deception must be met on the parts of humans with a corresponding 
knowledge of how to understand the technology in its ‘As if’ layers. Such an understand-
ing and knowledge are a prerequisite for benefiting from deceptive technology and at 
the same time precluding harm from that technology. What exactly is artificial intelli-
gence? What do algorithms do? How are all the systems with which I interact interre-
lated in a data economy and as a technosphere? If we further engage with interactive 
systems; if we want to enjoy the benefits of socio-sensitive technology, the deception 
competence inherent in a politeness literacy that facilitates and simultaneously protects 
interhuman social relations must be complemented by technology literacy, data literacy, 
AI literacy and so on. 
 
 
Ulysses pact… with technology 
 
 
15 This higher-level relation to new human-technology relations is then a meta-relation of sorts, meaning that the new 
cultural techniques for dealing with new technologies that are segmented as new routines and perhaps future traditions 
must in turn be embedded in a cultural, normative context. 
 
 
 
The notion of self-constraint is crucial in this context. Kant mentioned modesty as self-
constraint that conceals passion. Concealment and self-constraint are at the very core 
of civilization and being cultured. Impulse control or the ability to defer rewards, for in-
stance, are essential developmental steps every child has to take in order to become 
sociable. We use hygiene processes and products to conceal or not to impose our unal-
tered body (e.g. its odors or noises) on others. A groomed and controlled body is nature 
constrained by culture (whose standards, of course, vary greatly depending on the cul-
ture in question).16 Self-constraint is a difficult task that requires certain dispositions, 
practice, skills, and strategies. Such a strategy is evident in Kant’s detour to virtue via 
self-deception and the habituation mechanism. It is useful and necessary because it is 
difficult just to decide to be and then be genuinely virtuous in the intended way. Even if 
we want to have certain virtues, we struggle and, as with everything that we struggle 
with, we use technology to have it anyway. If we struggle to lift something, we use a 
lever. If we are unable to run or want to survive a marathon – unlike Pheidippides, who 
died upon arrival – we go by car. If we fail to actually exhibit the desired behavior, we 
use strategies, along with several technologies. One such strategy is called a Ulysses 
pact.  
Ulysses, the most witty, resourceful, strategic, and cunning hero (all epithetically 
summarized as polymechanos) in Greek mythology, encounters the Sirens, bird-women 
who sing beautifully and lure sailors – completely absorbed by the Sirens’ performance 
– to their death by shipwreck and drowning. Ulysses, however, has adequate 
knowledge of ‘how they should be taken’. This heroic Siren literacy includes the fact, for 
instance, that the Sirens’ power lies only in their song and not in their visual appear-
ance, so that you lose self-control and die by hearing them, yet not by seeing them. The 
Sirens are – just like the Sphinx – mantic creatures, which means that they possess 
prophetic knowledge and great wisdom (mantic truth). Ulysses desires this truth, which 
is why he does not want to avoid them completely. Due to his Siren literacy, he knows 
that he would lose his self-control the moment he listened to that sung truth. He wants 
to have it but struggles to get it. The solution is a pact he makes with his crew. He or-
ders them to tie him to the mast of his ship – which is a form of assisted self-constraint – 
and – which is the cunning part – to disobey any orders, especially to untie him, while 
under the influence of the Sirens. The crew then seal their ears, the gap in their defense 
against Sirens, with wax and navigate the ship into the sweet spot well within hearing 
range of the Sirens yet still at a safe distance from the cliffs. Fortunately, navigating a 
ship works with a bound and temporarily demoted captain and deaf but unbound crew 
members. Thus, Ulysses is able to learn the Sirens’ wisdom and survives to live with it. 
This is more or less the essence of technology use: enjoy the benefits while not having 
to suffer from the harm.  
Today, Ulysses contracts are a subject of discussion in clinical ethics, for exam-
ple where patients have a psychological condition that leads them to distrust their future 
selves.17  
 
16 Interestingly, the German word for toiletry bag is culture bag (Kulturbeutel). 
17 “Like Ulysses afraid to be lured by the sirens, these patients feel they cannot trust themselves and are prepared to 
give up their freedom for a limited time in order to protect themselves. For example, BPS [borderline personality syn-
 
 
 
 
Such contracts are a means to ensure against akrasia—weakness of the will, or 
not being willing to follow the course of treatment—or relapse of mental illness—
not being able to follow the course of treatment. Ulysses contracts have many 
potential applications. In general medicine, patients might use such contracts to 
aid in quitting smoking or to ensure that a course of painful, yet beneficial physi-
cal therapy is completed. In mental health, patients could use the contracts to en-
sure against relapse of mental illness. (Spellecy, 2003, pp. 375–376) 
 
Ulysses insured himself against a temporary Siren-induced akrasia, just as people 
might against alcohol-induced akrasia on a night out – forming a pact with their friends 
to ensure a safe journey home because their substance use literacy tells them that, 
once inebriated, they will lose the will to quit the party at an otherwise sensible point. 
Kant’s detour to virtue is a strategy that instrumentalizes self-constraint (modesty, po-
liteness) in order to achieve long-term self-deception (pretending to care about or re-
spect someone or something) that ultimately results in the desired moral disposition (be-
ing a caring and respectful person). Here, what someone wants to ‘have’18 is not mantic 
truth but genuinely virtuous dispositions. But there is good reason not to trust our future 
selves to follow through on our past or present resolutions. Otherwise, the gyms would 
be overcrowded throughout the year and not just in January and before the beach sea-
son. We clearly need strategies to help or even force our future selves to exhibit behav-
ior that we desire today or that we desire in principle, yet tend to put aside all too easily. 
For lack of a ship’s crew to make commanded self-constraint contracts, we turn to the 
common strategy of using technology as a surrogate for human staff, a process that is 
often called automation. We can make a Ulysses pact with our smartphone and grant a 
given application actual punishing (constraining) power such as the power to transfer 
predefined amounts of our money. For instance, the application StickK (StickK, 2019) is 
a Ulysses pact platform that is designed to help users to “finally stick to their commit-
ment” – be it a ten-minute walk after each meal, quitting smoking, working at least one 
hour each day on their dissertation, etc.19 Even though “the market for self-punishing 
products may be small” (Ubel, 2014) – as yet! – the idea of automating sanctionable 
self-constraint on an everyday level in order to achieve a desired outcome, behavior, or 
disposition on a higher level is compelling. In a way – albeit simple and one-dimensional 
one – Google’s and Amazon’s ‘ask nicely’ functionalities position their devices (e.g. 
Echo) and the connected infrastructures and services (e.g. Alexa) as potential parties to 
 
drome, BG] patients sometimes come to psychiatric emergency units and display a help-seeking behavior and pro-
nounce suicidal intentions, but at the same time, they communicate, directly or indirectly, that voluntary care is not an 
option for them staying at the hospital since they cannot trust themselves.” Lundahl, Helgesson, and Juth (2017, p. 83) 
18 NB: hexis in Aristotle is associated with possession, having something (knowledge, skills, virtues, etc.), yet in a way 
that is interrelated with being. Having virtues equals being virtuous, just as having shoes on is the same as being shod 
and having skills as being skilled, etc. See Rodrigo (2011). 
19 “Some people commit the money to a charity they detest, to further motivate themselves—knowing that the failure to 
take a ninety-minute bike ride will mean contributing twenty dollars to an organization on the wrong side of the right-to-
life/right-to-choice debate offers a certain motivation to hit the road. According to a Harvard Business Review study, 
published in April, the company’s success rate for contracts without stakes is 42.7 per cent; with stakes, it is 82.8 per 
cent. And if the money is going to a charity the user dislikes, the success rate is even higher, 87.1 per cent.” Ubel 
(2014) 
 
 
 
a Ulysses contract with whom users whose resolution is constantly tested by a plethora 
of everyday Mini-Sirens can team up against their own weakness of will (akrasia). 
Kant’s way to virtue is facilitated by the detour via self-deception and habituation and it 
can be protected from vicious akrasia by concluding Ulysses pacts with artificial crew-
members: with apps, devices, services, and infrastructures. Google’s “Pretty Please” 
feature and even today’s pre-commitment automation are but an attention-seeking di-
version that aims to soothe concerns that might arise in the face of the pervasion of as-
sistive technology in our everyday lives. Emerging and future socio-sensitive interactive 
technology that could potentially consider many manifestations of the above-mentioned 
dimensions of social appropriateness – situational context, action or task, individual 
specifics, social relation, shared/customary standards – could be a powerful crew with 
which to contract.  
 
 
Artificial Ulysses crew – sassy assistants 
 
Artificial Ulysses crewmembers could help to bridge two interrelated gaps in consistent 
action: one in time and one in awareness. Firstly, there is a time gap in every action due 
to the sequential nature of tasks. We have to perform one after the other in order to get 
something done. Each task or action consumes a certain amount of time or requires 
specific timing. Ethics – the discipline of ‘What should I do?’ – addresses this time gap 
at its core as it always asks ‘What should I do now or next, in order for X to happen in 
the future?’ In turn, previous actions determine the scopes of possible responses to this 
question and the options now available. The basic problem here is why a present indi-
vidual should be entitled to make decisions for a future individual, a decision on which 
the latter must follow through and for which the latter can be held responsible. After all, 
we clearly differ in terms of knowledge, preferences, and will over time. On the other 
hand, why do we allow and often demand present individuals to revise and ignore their 
past choices? In order for society to function and groups to succeed in cooperation, 
there has to be some degree of predictability and accountability (Bratman, 2018) and 
strategies such as announcements, contracts, threats and promises serve to bridge this 
time gap. By one part of the objective spirit – namely law – you have to follow through 
on the consequences of a contract that your former self concluded even if your present 
self no longer shares its object or implications. However, this pragmatic, social, inter-in-
dividual reason does not apply to the intra-individual time gap: I can always change my 
mind; this is a sign of education and personal development and the opposite of stub-
bornness, dogmatism, or fundamentalism. A Ulysses pact is a strategy for using inter-
individual cooperation – through the social construct of a contract – in order to ensure 
an intra-individual bridging of the time gap. This is a difficult phenomenon: why does the 
will of a contracting patient with borderline personality syndrome (BPS) at moment t1 
trump and constrain that person's will at moment t2? In other words, why are Ulysses 
contracts allowed at all and specifically in a clinical context? To move on from poten-
tially pathological special cases to our everyday condition of action: why do I at t2 have 
to follow through on a decision that I at t1 made before; why do we appreciate reliability, 
commitment, and consistency? Simultaneously, why do we invest so much as a society 
in changing an individual's knowledge and preferences deliberately, a process that is 
 
 
 
called education? And if changing one's will, knowledge and preferences is paramount 
for any society and the notion of progress, how can we allow strategies that preempt ac-
tions for following through on the consequences of such a change? How we value con-
sistency or spontaneity, predictability or flexibility, stability or change are fundamental 
questions that need to be scrutinized before socio-sensitive interactive technology or ar-
tificial Ulysses crewmembers are introduced into our everyday life. Interactive technol-
ogy can preempt or facilitate significant potential for future change, progress, and devel-
opment. The contracts we enter into can substantially transform how open our future is 
and the range and type of possibilities open to us. 
The potential to use such contracts with artificial crewmembers to facilitate pro-
gress and further open up our future depends on the second gap, the awareness gap. 
Although our will changes over time, we often have a number of goals that are fairly in-
variable; this applies in particular to more abstract objectives such as to be more attrac-
tive, to lose weight, to work out, etc. or to be wiser, to study, to engage in discussion, 
etc. Yet we tend to shape our lives and daily decisions in relation to different levels of 
awareness of those objectives at any moment. A procrastinating philosopher, for in-
stance, does not lose the will to write a book, but temporarily loses track of the goal or 
has doubts about the suitability of certain steps while, for instance, watching Epic Rap 
Battles – Western vs. Eastern Philosophers on YouTube – which might or might not ulti-
mately somehow help with the book project. The diet-breaker does not lose the will to 
get healthy or attractive through dieting when eating foie gras with melted raclette 
cheese. S/he simply values the enjoyment and hedonistic effects more highly at that 
moment than the health-related long-term effects.20 Is this akrasia or a sign that the 
higher-level goal was ill-chosen, maybe even merely adopted as a result of social main-
stream pressure? It is impossible to think of options in binary terms of suitable or non-
suitable for a specific goal or end. It is impossible to grasp all the means that can actual-
ize a certain end, just as it is impossible to conceive of all the ends a single means 
could actualize. Using emerging technology in order to ensure an (initial) pursuit of 
goals and to render that immune to second thoughts and misappropriation has to deal 
with this changing normativity and this gap of awareness or heightening and lessening 
levels of intentionality. The dynamic of this means-end-goals-wish hierarchy and of the 
varying awareness is intricately interlinked with the development of our preferences and 
objective systems over time. It is not so that we reflect on a wish – e.g. the good life – 
come up with suitable goals whose achievement brings us closer to that wish – e.g. be-
ing loved, respected, healthy, and rich – come up with suitable ends that bring us to 
those goals – e.g. being kind and respectful, eating healthy food, being industrious – 
and then come up with means that are suitable for actualizing those ends – e.g. practic-
ing, learning, studying, etc. Rather, we jump in at some point in this chain and when we 
encounter difficulties in finding a means, actualizing an end, or reaching a goal, or when 
we see other normative takes on what might be a part of a good life, how to weight 
wealth and affection, etc., we adjust the entire chain. Difficulties in getting comparatively 
rich? It is much more important to have friends and love anyway. Not so lucky with your 
 
20 For a compelling discussion on health and security, for example, as ends in themselves versus a hedonistic and 
aesthetic way of life using and occasionally suspending health as a means to more meaningful ends that are “worth 
living for”, see: Pfaller (2018). 
 
 
 
social relations? Success is paramount in life and money will buy you respect and even-
tually affection anyway. Your first novel flopped? Helping people is much more mean-
ingful than becoming an eccentric writer anyway.  
However, bearing in mind the challenge of this fluid normativity of ends, goals, 
and wishes, assistive systems could be deliberately designed to help compensate for 
undesired awareness loss and akrasia. Therefore, we could deploy an entire crew of 
contracting assistive systems that help us follow through on our higher-order resolutions 
and goals, by constraining – as commanded self-constraint – our options and the availa-
bility of our means on a lower-level. Competence-oriented assistive systems (Gransche, 
2018), for instance, could strategically refuse assistance on a lower means-end level 
(not navigating onto the Sirens’ cliffs even if commanded) in order to assist with higher 
end-goal-wish connections (listening to the Sirens’ song and surviving it). In the context 
of socio-sensitive systems and their potential role in leading to genuine virtue (or what-
ever behavioral ideal is set by an individual in a social and historical context), Kant’s de-
tour could quite possibly be assisted by cultured technology that (in order to work) ex-
hibits and demands a certain behavior that is enforced by constraining all other options. 
Ultimately, this means assisting the pursuit of a higher goal by assistance-denial on a 
lower level. This kind of crew ensures the survival of its captain by refusing to obey or-
ders while near the Sirens. It is the conditional time-gap equivalent of the paradoxical 
command: ‘Do not follow this order!’ Contracting with artificial assistants could get us 
into the position of a technosphere Ulysses with a crew of sassy assistants who assist – 
polymechanos-style – by denying assistance. Possible goals range from acquiring and 
surviving mantic truth to mastering passions through modesty with polite self-constraint. 
On an education level, this assistance would not mean delegating the performance of a 
task, but rather supporting the supervision and regulation of de- and upskilling pro-
cesses for desired abilities such as navigating by map, organizing a wedding, or behav-
ing in a socially appropriate, personally recognized way. 
 
 
What ability to constrain? Level-selective assistance. 
 
Socially intervening technology can play a role in technologically mediated de- and up-
skilling processes. Design, development, and implementation of and relating to such 
technology can deliberately train people in desired and “cure” them of undesired behav-
ior – which poses the question of which behavior is which. To help designers and engi-
neers create technology that allows for stable relations with the desired behavior, de-
sired behavior must be distinguished from undesired behavior. If pleasant, somehow 
cultivated social interactions are commonly appreciated, then technology that success-
fully simulates and demands cultured (polite) behavior could help us to enact corre-
sponding (at first non-genuine) behavior until it leads to genuinely virtuous dispositions 
– regardless of the self-deception and ‘As if’ difference – that in turn give rise to behav-
ior that is authentically the way it was previously staged yet enforced by an artificial 
Ulysses crew. 
To navigate this question away from the cliffs of relative subjective desires, we 
can steer it towards collective conceptions of social appropriateness. Bearing in mind 
the above-mentioned connection of ends, goals, and wishes, it is safe to say that what 
 
 
 
an individual or society deems desirable depends in one way or another – ex negativo 
or ex positivo – on what is customarily judged as socially appropriate or not. Even if, for 
example, there is not one specific number of centimeters that separate an appropriate 
talking distance from an inappropriate one, it cannot be denied that physical proximity 
is, all over the world, one factor in whether an interacting entity is judged more or less 
appropriate. Which specific distance will be judged as appropriate in a specific situation 
between specific agents with a specific relation performing a specific task etc. cannot be 
generalized: as the five aforementioned dimensions of social appropriateness show, it 
depends on the culture, customary standards or ethos, or as Hegel terms it, the objec-
tive spirit (objektiver Geist). The objective spirit refers to all those phenomena that are 
man-made but cannot be altered by the individual, i.e. that the individual encounters as 
given. Other prominent phenomena that fit this definition of the objective spirit are his-
tory, custom, state, law, art, religion, science, economy, and language – the latter being 
“the finite, historical heir to the objective spirit” (Ricœur, 1996, p. 65) – in another word: 
culture. Hegel defines the objective spirit as “a form of reality as a world that was cre-
ated and has to be created by man, in which freedom is a present necessity.” [my trans-
lation] (Hegel, 1986, p. 32) In modal terms, the phenomena of the objective spirit fall 
into both the modal spheres of the possible and the necessary depending on the collec-
tive or individual level and depending on what are usually large timescales. They are 
part of the possible (accidence) sphere because they are man-made; they could be oth-
erwise; they could be changed. Yet they are not at the disposal of an individual chang-
ing will.  
The set of customary practices, the ethos, is by definition part of the objective 
spirit. Those customary standards are but the sum of individual behavior and actions of 
certain groups, collectives, or societies.  
 
[T]he objectifications of life tend to deposit and sediment themselves in a durable 
acquisition which assumes all the appearances of the Hegelian objective spirit. If 
I can understand vanished worlds, it is because each society has created its own 
medium of understanding by creating the social and cultural worlds in which it un-
derstands itself. (Ricœur, 2016, p. 12) 
 
The objective spirit could be seen as something like a hill that was not created geologi-
cally but by the remants of and material left by a past settlement. Over time, the material 
accumulates in layers and future generations can either walk on the top layer or dig into 
the sediments for an archaeological investigation. They can even come to the errone-
ous belief that the hill's origin was geological (that is mistaking the objective spirit as na-
ture), but they can neither ignore nor undo a deeper layer. Even though each layer con-
sists of single individual contributions, none of them are made by a sole individual. Be-
havior creates deposits in the form of traditions if it is sufficiently collectively manifested 
and repeated. The sediments are then the transcendental condition affecting any further 
behavior. Which behavior becomes a customary standard and which collective stand-
ards eventually shape individual behavior depends on exposure. 
Socially intervening systems will – and technology generally, yet less specifically, 
always already does – create enormous exposure. The more we act and interact with 
 
 
 
technology and within technologically transformed conditions, the more technology be-
comes a major factor in shaping our behavior. Apart from powerful radical attempts – 
like propaganda, dictatorship, or religion – it is almost impossible to explicitly design the 
ethos, our customs, and thus to shape what counts as appropriate behavior, because 
the sedimentation of the objective spirit is a matter of multitudes, if not of humanity. De-
liberate attempts to change it either tend to average out or can lead to customs or sedi-
mentary layers that are partly caused by the intervention but deviate significantly from 
the intention. Even education, one aforementioned attempt to deliberately change every 
individual's knowledge in a society, despite its relatively consolidated curricula, creates 
its exposure by way of thousands of individuals (teachers), thus including their individual 
differences, and so on. Education, a prerequisite for being cultured, makes a huge dif-
ference in the objective spirit, yet even the entire educational system cannot purpose-
fully shape a desired form; it rather transforms it somehow into some vague direction. 
You cannot start a new custom, you can just set a new rule. Whether the latter leads to 
the former is not up to your will.  
 
 
Deliberately shaping the objective spirit? 
 
The world economy, capitalism, and data and surveillance capitalism (Zuboff, 2019) 
tend to favor winner-takes-all “star-system” (Lanier, 2013, pp. 41–47) dynamics. One of 
the essential features that enable the technosphere and its services and business mod-
els is the interconnectedness of technology. This interconnectedness needs rigid norms 
and communication standards. Relating to the technosphere, relating to interconnected 
services implies relating to those norms and standards that are and have to be unified 
all over the world. If the other side of a relation (here: technology) is rigidly standard-
ized, then the entire relationship becomes more standardized, regardless of the differ-
ences of ‘one side’. Billions of Facebook users use standardized profile page options to 
present themselves; millions of Twitter users submit to the standard of 140 or 280 char-
acters; the standard interfaces of the handheld smartphones are palm-sized screens 
that standardize the human-device relations and bow more than three billions necks 
every day (GSMA Intelligence, 2019).  
Today's billions of smartphones – and with them the potential artificial assistants 
– and millions of assistance devices such as the Echo are designed and developed by a 
few thousand people and even fewer ultimately decide their final form. Yet those deci-
sions pre-structure a rather narrow set of potentially stable relations the users could 
possibly establish. With more than 5 billion mobile phone users worldwide in 2019 
(GSMA Intelligence, 2019), customary practices of socializing, dating, making an ap-
pointment, etc. drastically change. Globally converging effects due to exposure to 
standardized technology will probably increase with learning technology or artificial intel-
ligence because one service (e.g. Alexa) with a plethora of devices (e.g. Echo) can 
learn and integrate the informarion from all interaction entities from all over the world 
(Brown University, 2016). Interactive technology, communicative devices, and in partic-
ular cultured artificial agents create exposure to deliberately shape ‘the entities not at 
the disposal of just a few’; the comparatively few decision-makers in today's techno-
 
 
 
sphere create standards and new rules of social interaction that, as a result of the tre-
mendous exposure of the products, accelerate the habituation mechanism and thus the 
sedimentation processes of the objective spirit. Along with this acceleration, well-estab-
lished mechanisms of selection, variation, and reflection are undermined. By way of 
technology and habituation, some ‘Lords of the Siren Servers’ gain an as yet indirect but 
nonetheless much shorter route to deliberately influencing entities of the objective spirit 
and thus to shape customary standards almost directly to their liking (for now, primarily 
standards of consumption). This position could be compared – yet in an almost roman-
tic, subcomplex way – to medieval, Renaissance or absolutist monarchs: whatever the 
King did and how he did it – although himself subject to highly rigid customs and proto-
col – was adopted by customary multipliers like courtiers and set as the new customary 
standard. However, courtiers and eventually the rest of society (who could afford to) 
adopted the ruler's standards knowingly as ‘the ruler's standards’, whereas today we 
might very much object to granting the most influential ‘Lords of the Siren Servers’ such 
as Steve Jobs, Jack Ma, Larry Page, Marc Zuckerberg, or Jeff Bezoz the status of a 
ruler, especially not in terms of culture or aesthetics. Yet in a way they are much more 
powerful than a medieval King, because they are less bound by customary standards, 
and their influence is global. 
 
 
Ethical considerations 
 
The idea presented has significant normative implications. The sequence of steps can 
be grasped as follows: design technology – interact with that technology – interaction 
shapes behavior – exposure habituates behavior – change of the structure of the objec-
tive spirit. Of course, designing technology, in turn, is influenced by the transcendental 
condition of the objective spirit as well – there is a protocol for the King. There are two 
fundamental perspectives here. One focuses on the empowerment of society to influ-
ence the transcendental condition of their lifeforms, the objective spirit, in a more delib-
erate way. This would presuppose that the power of the Lord of the Siren Servers could 
be controlled democratically and an open normative debate about tolerated, accepted, 
respected, or desired lifeforms precedes and informs the design and development of 
cultured artificial agents. A second perspective focuses on the potentially threatening 
implications and vulnerability of society to the will, biases, and naiveties of a few tech 
giants that cast customary superstrata around the world. 
Both perspectives reveal a series of philosophical considerations that must ac-
company, complement and precede the development of socio-sensitive cultured tech-
nology and their pervasion of everyday life. If we are to preempt possible customary 
tech-giant despotism, the normative assumptions that influence the selection of one be-
havior over another, assumptions that are then implemented in the interactive systems 
and standardized, must be explicated, scrutinized and democratically sanctioned. Actual 
choices must be available on which system to use and there must be an awareness of 
the fact that this means choosing which transformation of the objective spirit to support 
and to promote. This still leaves an ethical dilemma surrounding who could be asked to 
judge the appropriateness of an action – not least given the importance of intercultural 
differences in such a judgment – that is then globally rolled out. Who could declare a 
 
 
 
sufficient consensus on the tolerability, acceptability, respectability, or desirability of cer-
tain behavior? If the objective spirit becomes in part deliberately designable, these 
choices must then be justified to the collective that is impacted by this design. How 
could minorities be protected or deviant behavior kept possible if they are not or it is not 
part of the current mainstream of desirability but nonetheless admissable and the hall-
mark of an open pluralistic society? Who could possibly train or design the interactive 
systems so that they exemplify desired behavior – and in turn expose us to it and edu-
cate us with it – without also teaching the systems all too human flaws, prejudices etc.? 
AI, algorithms and learning technology in a way mirror the capacities, limits, and mind-
sets of those who create learning mechanisms and those who provide the training data. 
But it is more of a distorted mirroring like the one we get by looking into Anish Kapoor's 
Cloud Gate sculpture. Could there possibly be any standard, any single action or behav-
ior that we could sufficiently agree on as welcome in the objective spirit and as a tran-
scendental condition for any further behavior, or is the mere attempt and therefore any 
global technology always inherently paternalistic? How could knowledge of “everyone 
knows how they should be taken” or “everyone understands”21 as part of data literacy or 
AI literacy possibly be achieved? Such knowledge is a precondition for the concept of 
beneficial deception as opposed to harmful deception. Therefore, if the answer to this 
last question were that such knowledge was impossible, then the beneficial potential of 
artificially assisted self-deception would be void. Subsequent questions would be how to 
limit the use of potentially harmfully deceiving technology or whether to ban it entirely.  
Education on how systemic interventions, deceptions or simulations from socially 
interactive cultured technology ‘should be taken’ would be a good start to mitigate the 
harmful potential of systemic deception. How deliberately to design the objective spirit – 
if possible via the detour of cultured technology – how to justify those design decisions 
vis-à-vis all affected persons, how to balance global technology against culture-specific 
customary standards, and – when considering all these implications – whether it is bet-
ter not to shake our robots' hands and say pretty please to Alexa at all: all these are ma-
jor questions facing a society that is researching, developing, and releasing social ro-
bots, companion technology, and artificial assistive agents, and that is enabling them to 
simulate cultured behavior and to dissimulate the Lords they really serve.  
 
21 Still referring to Kant: “But these demonstrations of politeness do not deceive because everyone knows how they 
should be taken.” Kant (1996, 38–39 [152]) 
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